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COMMERCIAL LAW
OVERVIEW

During the past survey period, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed a number of divergent issues in the area of commercial law. The
most noteworthy decisions include a limitation on Federal Home Loan Bank
Board authority, and limitation of bank liability under Article Three of the
Uniform Commercial Code. As in the past, bankruptcy decisions dominated
the commercial area. The cases were divided between those decided under
the repealed Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and those decided under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. Where pertinent, the decisions under the repealed Act have been analyzed under the Reform Act to indicate the current
status of the law. Additionally, the Tenth Circuit decisions affected other
commercial areas including secured transactions, Truth in Lending, and
usury. This article will discuss the majority of the reported commercial decisions of the past term, and will analyze the appellate court's most noteworthy decisions.
I.
A.

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

Negotiable Instruments

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to find a standard of care
based on negligence implicit in section 3-405 of the Uniform Commercial
Code (U.C.C. or the Code), finding the drawer of the check responsible for
I
the loss in Western Casualty &Surety Co. v. Citizens Bank of Las Cruces. Western
Casualty & Surety Co.2 brought suit against the Citizens Bank of Las Cruces
and the Bank of New Mexico alleging that the banks failed to comply with
reasonable commercial banking practices and standards in the handling of
public monies. Western accepted a fraudulently procured and improperly
indorsed warrant of the State of New Mexico for payment in the amount of
$395,000. 3 The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendant banks on all claims. The issues presented on appeal were whether
4
the banks were entitled to the statutory defense of section 3-405 of the Code
and, if so, what standard of care is required by section 3-405.
The Tenth Circuit court found section 3-4055 directly applicable. An
employee of the drawer, the State of New Mexico, supplied the State with
the name of a payee, the Greater Mesilla Valley Sanitation District, a ficti1. 676 F.2d 1344 (10th Cir. 1982).
2. Western Casualty was subrogated to the claims of the State of New Mexico by virtue of
its payment as surety on an employee blanket bond for state employees. Id. at 1345.
3. The warrant was presented to, accepted, and processed by Citizens Bank, and forwarded to the Bank of New Mexico, fiscal agent for the state, for payment from state funds. Id.
4. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-3-405 (1978).
5. Id. Section 3-405 of the U.C.C. states in pertinent part:
(1) An indorsement by any person in the name of a named payee is effective if:
(a) an imposter by use of the mails or otherwise has induced the maker or
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tious sanitation district, 6 "intending the latter to have no . . .interest" in
the instrument issued. 7 Section 3-405 places the loss on the drawer-employer
who is in a position to prevent such forgeries by its employees. 8 Western
Casualty argued that the banks were not entitled to the protection of section
3-405 because the indorsement was not identical to the name of the payee, 9
and section 3-405 requires indorsement "in the name of a named payee."' 0
The Tenth Circuit held that the difference in spelling between the indorsement, Greater Mesilla Valley Sanitation District, and the name of the payee,
Grater Mesilla Valley Sanitation District, was not significant and would not
defeat the banks' protection from loss under section 3-405.11
Western Casualty Co. also argued that the banks acted negligently in
accepting, processing, and making payment on the fraudulently procured
warrant. Section 3-405 does not stipulate a requisite standard of care for
banks and the New Mexico courts have not addressed the issue.12 Judge
McKay's opinion in Western Casualy noted that there is a split of authority
on the issue of whether a bank's negligence precludes protection from loss
under section 3-405.' 3 Some authorities argue that a drawer should be able
to proceed against a bank on a common law action for negligence under
drawer to issue the instrument to him or his confederate in the name of the payee;
or

(b) a person signing as or on behalf of a maker or drawer intends the payee
to have no interest in the instrument; or
(c) an agent or employee of the maker or drawer has supplied him with the
name of the payee intending the latter to have no such interest.
6. The warrant was issued to a fictitious entity, the Greater Mesilla Valley Sanitation
District, which had been created by two state employees to defraud the State of money. 676
F.2d at 1345.
7. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-3-405(1)(c) (1978).
8. Comment 4 to § 3-405 of the U.C.C. explains the rationale for placing the loss on the
drawer in such cases under § 3-405(l)(c):
[T]he loss should fall upon the employer as a risk of his business enterprise rather than
upon the subsequent holder or drawee. The reasons are that the employer is normally
in a better position to prevent such forgeries by reasonable care in the selection or
supervision of his employees, or, if he is not, is at least in a better position to cover the
loss by fidelity insurance; and that the cost of such insurance is properly an expense of
his business rather than of the business of the holder or drawee.
U.C.C. § 3-405, Comment 4 (1981). Such cases are often referred to as "padded payroll" cases.
9. The warrant was payable to the Grater Mesilla Valley Sanitation District, while the
indorsement was in the name Greater Mesilla Valley Sanitation District. 676 F.2d at 1346.
10. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-3-405 (1978). The Western Casualty court noted that § 3-405
does not specify whether the payee's name and the indorsement must be identical in every
respect. 676 F.2d at 1346.
Generally, an indorsement need not match the payee's name exactly. See U.C.C. §§ I201(39) & Comment 39; 3-401(2) & Comment 2; 3-203 & Comment 3 (1981).
11. Comment I to § 3-405 of the U.C.C. states that the instrument must bear "what purports to be a regular chain of indorsements." The Western Casualty court explained that the
indorsement requirement is to ensure that the check presents a "normal appearance" and that
the person negotiating it "can reasonably be identified as the intended payee." 676 F.2d at
1346. See Comment, UC C § 3-405: Of Impostors, FictitiousPayees, and PaddedPayrolls, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 1083, 1093 (1979).
The Tenth Circuit court noted that a bank would not be protected under § 3-405 if the
indorsement name were completely different from that of the payee. 676 F.2d at 1346 n.2.
12. Id. at 1347.
13. Much of the controversy is centered on § 3-406 and § 4-406, which allow a negligent
drawer to defeat a bank's defense to a forgery by showing that the bank acted negligently. Id at
1347.
Section 3-406 states that a drawer who has contributed to the making of an unauthorized
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section 3-405 by virtue of section 1-103,14 which supplements the Code with
general "principles of law and equity" unless "displaced by the particular
provisions" of the Code.' 5 In addition, jurisdictions outside the Tenth Circuit have held that negligence will bar a bank's protection under section 3405 because of the general requirement of good faith in dealing with negotiable instruments imposed under section 1-203.1"
The Tenth Circuit held that because Code sections 3-406 and 4-406
explicitly shift the liability for forgeries from bank customers to negligent
banks,' 7 "the absence of such language in section 3-405 implicitly demonstrates, in our view, an intent to displace common law negligence actions."' 8
The court reasoned that the section at issue was conceived as a banker's
provision that was intended to narrow the liability of banks while increasing
the responsibility of their customers,' !' and that the loss should be placed on
the party in the best position to prevent it-the drawer.20 The Tenth Circuit refused to find that a bank's negligence precludes protection under section 3-405 and affirmed the summary judgment against Western Casualty.
The Tenth Circuit court's holding in Western Casualy obviates any obligation of good faith by banks in check forgery cases under section 3-405.
Although the policy under this section of placing the burden of loss on the
employer in an embezzlement type of situation is sound, such a policy should
not diminish a bank's obligation to exercise due care and good faith in paying any check. The New York Supreme Court in a well-reasoned opinion,
Board of Education v. Bankers Trust Co.,' 1 held that the fact the forged
indorsements were effective under section 3-405 was not determinative of the
bank's liability. The court held that the drawee bank has an obligation to
exercise due care and can only charge a customer's account for checks cashed
in good faith. "If [the Bank] cashed these checks as a result of its own negligence, and not in good faith, it is liable . . . notwithstanding the effectivesignature may not assert the lack of authority against a bank "who pays the instrument in good
faith and in accordance with . . . reasonable commercial standards." U.C.C. § 3-406 (1981).
Under § 4-406 a customer is allowed recovery against a bank if the customer "establishes
lack of ordinary care on the part of the bank in paying the item(s)." U.C.C. § 4-406(3) (1981).
14. Professors White and Summers argue that the standard of care provisions under § 3406 and § 4-406 should be applicable to prevent a negligent bank from avoiding loss under § 3405. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 16-8, at 638-39 (2d ed. 1980). See Sun 'n Sand, Inc. v. United Bank of Cal., 21 Cal.
3d 671, 695, 582 P.2d 920, 937, 148 Cal. Rptr. 329, 346 (1978). The Western Casualty court noted
that § 3-405 does not explicitly displace the bank's obligation to act with reasonable care, "it
simply does not discuss the bank's standard of care." 676 F.2d at 1347.
15. U.C.C. § 1-103 (1981).
16. § 1-203 requires that: "Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of
good faith in its performance or enforcement." The official comment to this section defines
good faith as "honesty in fact."
For cases where negligence of the bank barred its use of § 3-405, see Owensboro Nat'l Bank
v. Sam Crisp, 78-CA-401-MR (Ky. App. Aug. 31, 1979) (cited in U.C.C. DIGEST, 1982 Cum.
Supp. No. 1); Board of Educ. v. Bankers Trust Co., 86 Misc. 2d 560, 383 N.Y.S.2d 508 (1976).
17. See sur/a note 13.
18. 676 F.2d at 1348.
19. Id. (quoting General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Citizens Fidelity Bank &
Trust Co., 519 S.W.2d 817, 819 (Ky. Ct. App. 1975)).
20. See U.C.C. § 3-405, Comment 4 (1981).
21. Board of Educ. v. Bankers Trust Co., 86 Misc. 2d 560, 383 N.Y.S.2d 508, 510 (1977).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL
ness of the endorsements."

[Vol. 60:2

22

A bank's obligation to exercise good faith in accepting, processing, and
making payment on its customers' checks, albeit forged, is mandated by section 1-203 of the Code. The bank should not be able to avoid the loss under
section 3-405 if it acts negligently in making payment on such a forged
check.
B.

A "Lease" as a Secured Transaction

In In re Fashion Optical, Ltd.23 the Tenth Circuit, interpreting an
Oklahoma statute, formulated a four-step ad hoc approach to determine
whether a purported lease is in reality a secured transaction. The bankruptcy trustee appealed the district court's holding that a transfer of equipment from Fashion Optical, Ltd. (bankrupt) to defendant Dr. Gebetsberger
was neither a fraudulent conveyance 24 nor a transfer intended as security,
25
but was a true lease.
The controversy between the trustee and Gebetsberger focused on a
purported sale and leaseback of optical equipment. The bankrupt sold Gebetsberger $53,280 of new and used optical equipment for $50,000 in June
1977.26 The used equipment was valued at $7,265 and in the bankrupt's
possession before and after the alleged sale. The remaining $42,375 of equipment was new and had been ordered by the bankrupt from an optical equipment company. The bankrupt's checks in payment were returned for
insufficient funds, and Gebetsberger, a business associate and friend of the
bankrupt's president, intervened and purchased the equipment directly.

27

The equipment was delivered directly to the bankrupt's offices.
Approximately one week later, Gebetsberger entered into a purported
leaseback agreement with the bankrupt. The lease provided for rent of
$1,000 per month for sixty months, resulting in a total rental price of
$60,000.28 In addition, the agreement gave the bankrupt a five-year option

to purchase the equipment for the greater of ten percent of the original cost
or fair market value. Payments were made for thirteen months before Fashion Optical became insolvent.
The trustee in bankruptcy argued that the arrangement was a transfer
intended as security 29 rather than a true lease, and thus subject to the filing
provisions in Article Nine of the U.C.C. Gebetsberger did not perfect any
security interest under the Code. 30 Therefore, the trustee would prevail if
the agreement was characterized as an installment sale to the bankrupt with
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
cash for
27.
28.

383 N.Y.S.2d at 511.
653 F.2d 1385 (10th Cir. 1981) (sub.noma.Steele v. Gebetsberger).
This portion of the decision will not be discussed herein.
653 F.2d at 1386.
The bill of sale was dated June 23, 1977. On June 27, 1977, Gebetsberger paid $50,000
the equipment. Id.
Id.
Id. at 1386-87.

29. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 1-201(37) (West 1972).

30. 653 F.2d at 1388.
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3t
Gebetsberger retaining a security interest.

Based on Oklahoma's definition of a security interest, 32 the Tenth Circuit adopted a four-step approach to determine whether a lease is in reality a
secured transaction. First, the court held that the presence of a purchase
option does not automatically preclude a finding of a true lease. Second, if a
purchase option allows the lessee to become full owner by "merely paying no
33
or nominal consideration after complying with its terms, the inquiry ends."
The lease will be deemed a secured transaction as a matter of law, and thus
subject to the provisions of Article Nine. Third, if the option requires
greater than nominal consideration for full ownership, a true lease will usually be found. 34 Fourth, the absence of a purchase option will not automatically imply a true lease. Thus, even though the lease does not permit
purchase at nominal consideration, it will still be deemed a security interest
if the economic realities tend to confirm "a secured transfer of ownership is
afoot."

35

The court was not, however, content to apply only the four-step approach 36 outlined above, but also considered the following factors, which
under Oklahoma law tend to indicate a true lease: 1) an option price that is
approximately the market value at the time of exercise of the option,
2) rental charges that compensate lessor for loss of value over the term of the
lease, 3) nonexcessive rentals and an option purchase price which is not too
low, and 4) facts indicating that lessee is acquiring no equity during the term
of the lease. 37 The court also considered two additional factors under section
1-201(37)38 to determine whether a security interest was intended: 1) the
percentage that the option purchase price bears to list price, 39 and
2) whether the terms of the lease are such that they strongly favor exercise of
31. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 9-301(1)(b) (West 1972). See Bankruptcy Act of 1898,
§ 70(c) (formerly 11 U.S.C. § I10(c)).
32. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 1-201(37) (West 1972) defines a security interest as:
[An interest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation. . . . Whether a lease is intended as security is to be determined
by the facts of each case; however, (a) the inclusion of an option to purchase does not
of itself make the lease one intended for security, and (b) an agreement that upon
compliance with the terms of the lease the lessee shall become or has the option to
become the owner of the property for no additional consideration or for a nominal
consideration does make the lease one intended for security.
33. 653 F.2d at 1388. The court cited the following cases to support this proposition: Percival Constr. Co. v. Miller & Miller Auctioneers, Inc., 532 F.2d 166, 171-72 (10th Cir. 1976),
affig 387 F. Supp. 882 (W.D. Okla. 1973); Citicorp Leasing, Inc. v. Allied Inst. Distrib., Inc., 454
F. Supp. 511, 516 (W.D. Okla. 1977); Dynalectron Corp. v. Jack Richards Aircraft Co., 337 F.
Supp. 659, 661 (W.D. Okla. 1972).
34. 653 F.2d at 1389. See, e.g., Crest Inv. Trust, Inc. v. Atlantic Mobile Corp., 252 Md.
286, 250 A.2d 246 (1969).
35. 653 F.2d at 1389. See, e.g., In re Brookside Drug Store, Inc., 3 Bankr. 120 (D. Conn.
1980).
36. This approach has been used in other recent decisions to determine whether a lease was
in fact a security interest. See Towe Farms, Inc. v. Central Iowa Prod. Credit Ass'n, 528 F.
Supp. 500, 503 (S.D. Iowa 1981); In re Int'l Plastics, Inc., 18 Bankr. 583, 586 (D. Kan. 1982).
37. 653 F.2d at 1389. See Percival Const. Co. v. Miller & Miller Auctioneers, Inc., 387 F.
Supp. 882, 885 (W.D. Okla. 1973), aft'd, 532 F.2d 166 (10th Cir. 1976).
38. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 1-201(37) (West 1972).
39. The court noted this factor is especially relevant if the option price is less than 25% of
the list price. 653 F.2d at 1389.
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the option at the end of the lease term. 4 0 The lease at issue fixed the option
price in terms of fair market value to avoid the inference of a security agreement due to a low option price and favorable option terms.
The Tenth Circuit held that the absence of evidence on the equipment's
fair market value and useful economic life was crucial because the facts did
not otherwise indicate a security arrangement. 4 ' A security agreement
would be inferred if the market value of the equipment was, at the time for
exercise of the option, so low that the option price was nominal consideration under section 1-201(37). Also, the fact that the total rental exceeded the
original cost could indicate interest payments in a financed installment
sale. 4 2 Such an excess over original purchase price may not eliminate the
43
finding of a true lease.
The Tenth Circuit held that the inclusion of a fair market value price in
an option will not automatically meet the consideration requirement of section 1-201(37), thereby indicating a true sale and lease-back agreement. If
there is evidence that the option price of market value is great enough so
that the lessee will be paying more than nominal consideration for the item,
then a lease will be found. 44 The court remanded the case for a determination under the court's four-pronged approach of whether the purported lease
in question is in reality a secured transaction. It is unclear, however, how
much weight will be given to the Tenth Circuit's four-step test in light of the
court's reliance on a number of additional factors in conjunction with its
test. With its Fashion Optical opinion, the appellate court has merely added
another set of factors, and not a conclusive test, for determining whether a
lease is in fact a secured transaction.
II.

LIMITATION OF FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK BOARD AUTHORITY

In Otero Savings & Loan Association v.Federal Home Loan Bank Board 45 a
divided Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board (Bank Board) lacks authority to impose a compensatory "penalty box" remedy in addition to a cease and desist order. The appeal arose
from an order4 6 of the Bank Board and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) that Otero Savings and Loan Association's
(Otero) "Check-In" program violated section 1832(a) of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Act. 47 The order directed Otero to close all checking
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1390. See, e.g., All-States Leasing Co. v. Ochs, 42 Or. App. 319, 600 P.2d 899
(1974).

42. See, e.g., National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Priority Elec. Corp., 435 F. Supp. 236, 239
(E.D.N.Y. 1977).
43. 653 F.2d at 1390. A lease could be found if the equipment depreciated only slightly or
in fact appreciated in value over the rental period.
44. The court noted that fair market value could fall to a nominal level, especially toward
the latter part of an item's useful economic life, and thereby not meet the consideration requirements of OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 1-201(37) (West 1972). 653 F.2d at 1390.
45. 665 F.2d 279 (10th Cir. 1981).
46. An administrative proceeding was brought against Otero Savings & Loan Association
by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1730(e)
(Supp. IV 1980).
47. 12 U.S.C. § 1832(a) (Supp. IV 1980) (as amended by Depository Institutions Deregula-
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accounts held by for-profit corporations and partnerships and to cease offering new customer "Check-In" or related automatic transfer system accounts
for a period of 268 days following the effective date of the order. 48 The 268day penalty was conceived as an equitable offset, since Otero had achieved a
competitive advantage by offering "Check-In" accounts 268 days before they
were legally permitted.4 9 The Bank Board order was stayed pending this
decision. 50 Otero argued on appeal that it had not violated section 183251
and that the Bank Board and FSLIC had no power to grant the type of relief
encompassed by the order.
A.

FactualBackground

In April 1980, Otero, a Colorado state-chartered savings and loan association, began offering a checking account service known as the "Check-In"
program. 52 The program was an automatic transfer system of withdrawal
under which a customer opened two accounts, an interest-bearing savings
account and a non-interest-bearing checking account. When the customer
wrote a check, an amount equivalent to the check was automatically transferred from the savings account to the checking account and the check was
paid.
However, section 183251 prohibited a savings and loan association from
offering negotiable order of withdrawal (NOW) accounts before January 1,
1981. 5 4 NOW accounts are single accounts from which customers may write
checks. Both Otero's "Check-In" accounts and NOW accounts were interest-bearing demand deposit accounts. Otero's "Check-In" accounts resulted
in more than $10 million in new deposits during the first three months they
were offered. 55
Following an administrative hearing, the Bank Board issued a tempotion and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132. This section allows
all depository institutions to permit withdrawals from interest-bearing accounts, except accounts of for-profit corporations, by negotiable or transferable instruments payable to third
parties only after Dec. 31, 1980.
48. 665 F.2d at 281.
49. Id at 287 n.7.
50. Otero Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Reserve Bank, 665 F.2d 275 (10th Cir. 1981) (grant
of preliminary injunction was proper where harm to public and associations if bank stopped
processing drafts was much greater than any harm which would be felt by bank). The order
grantihg preliminary injunctive relief appears in Otero Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 497 F. Supp. 370 (D. Colo. 1980).
51. 12 U.S.C. § 1832(a) (Supp. IV 1980). See Otero Sav. &Loan Ass'n, 665 F.2d at 282 n.2.
52. 665 F.2d at 281; Rocky Mountain News, June 13, 1980, at 134, col. 1.
53. 12 U.S.C. § 1832(a) (1976) provides:
(a) No depository institution shall allow the owner of a deposit or account on which
interest or dividends are paid to make withdrawals by negotiable or transferable instruments for the purpose of making transfers to third parties, except that such withdrawals may be made in the States of Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island,
Maine, Vermont, and New Hampshire.
This provision was amended in 1980, see supra note 47.
54. See 665 F.2d at 282 n.2.
55. Rocky Mountain News, June 13, 1980, at 134, col. 1. Such accounts were also offered
by Majestic Savings and Loan of Denver and Sun Savings and Loan Association of Golden. Id.
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rary cease and desist order,5 6 which imposed the moratorium on opening of
any new Check-In-type of accounts. Otero appealed the order on the
grounds that its two-account "Check-In" system was not a NOW account
system and thus not illegal under section 1832. Otero also questioned the
Bank Board's authority to impose the moratorium.

B. Illegality of "Check-In" Accounts
The Tenth Circuit appellate panel held that Otero is an insured institution within the meaning of section 1724 of the Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation Act because its accounts are insured by the FSLIC. Therefore
it is a depository institution subject to section 1832(a). 57 Otero argued that
section 1832(a) prohibits one-account NOW systems prior to January 1,
1981, and not its two-account automatic transfer system.58 The majority
opinion by Judge Logan states that the statutory language of section 1832(a)
is broad enough to encompass both types of accounts and that the legislative
history of the section indicates that Congress did not intend to differentiate
between the two types of accounts. 59 Therefore, section 1832(a) applies to
prohibit Otero's "Check-In," automatic transfer system type account during
1980.

C. Bank Board's Cease and Desist Power
Otero also contended that the Bank Board did not have the power to
enforce section 1832 by a cease and desist order. 6° Otero argued that only
those statutes which expressly provide for enforcement by the Bank Board or
FSLIC are enforceable by cease and desist orders. 61 Section 1832 contains
no express delegation of authority, and in fact, makes no provision for enforcement. A unanimous appellate panel affirmed the power of the Bank
Board and FSLIC to use its cease and desist powers62 to remedy violations of
section 1832(a).
The majority opinion'rejected Otero's argument that the FSLIC and
Bank Board may only enforce those statutes that contain specific delegations
of authority. Judge Holloway stated that the specific delegations may have
56. The order was issued pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1730(0(1) (Supp. IV 1980). 665 F.2d at
289 n.9.
57. 12 U.S.C. § 1832(a) (Supp. IV 1980); set supra note 53. Cf. Wisconsin Bankers Ass'n v.
Mutual Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Wis., 96 Wis. 2d 438, 291 N.W.2d 869 (1980) (state-chartered
savings and loan, not insured by FSLIC, allowed to use negotiable order of withdrawal accounts
under state statute).
58. 665 F.2d at 282.
59. Id. at 282-83. Judge McKay's concurrence discussed the legislative history in detail,
however, much of the discussion is beyond the scope of this overview. Id. at 289-91 (McKay, J.,
concurring).
60. 665 F.2d at 283.
61. Otero cited the Truth-in-Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976); the Electronic Funds
Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1693o(a)(2) (1976); the Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 16921(b)(2) (1976); the Community Reinvestment Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2905 (1976); and
the Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1054(a) (1976) as examples of specific delegations of enforcement authority. 665 F.2d at 284.
62. 12 U.S.C. § 1730(e)(1) (Supp. IV 1980) permits the Bank Board or FSLIC to act where
an institution has violated or is about to violate "a law, rule, or regulation."
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been included only as clarification of statutes that are enforced by different
agencies. 6 3 The Bank Board relied heavily on a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision 64 holding that the Bank Board has broad authority over federal savings and loans to enforce rules and regulations, regardless of whether
Congress had expressly directed the Bank Board to enforce them. In addition, the Tenth Circuit panel emphasized that the Third Circuit 65 had
granted the Comptroller of the Currency 66 jurisdiction to enforce compliance with a New Jersey anti-redlining statute by national banks located in
that state. The statutory language conferring cease and desist power to the
Comptroller 67 is identical to the language of section 1730(e), which confers
cease and desist power to the Bank Board against state savings and loan
68
associations.
The Tenth Circuit conceded that Otero, as a state-chartered institution,
is not subject to the same "all-encompassing regulation 'from its cradle to its
corporate grave' as are federally chartered institutions." 69 Nevertheless, the
court concluded that the language of section 1730(e)(1), which refers to violations of "a law," is quite broad. 70 Thus, the appellate panel held that the
FSLIC and the Bank Board have power under section 1730(e) to enforce the
prohibition of section 183271 by use of cease and desist orders.
D.

Bank Board's Remedial Power

Although the Tenth Circuit panel was in harmony as to the Bank
Board's authority to enforce section 1832, the enforcement chosen by the
Bank Board created a note of discord. A divided Tenth Circuit court 72 vacated the portions of the Bank Board order that temporarily prohibited
Otero from opening any new "Check-In," NOW, or similar types of accounts
73
and from advertising such accounts for 268 days after issuance of the order.
The Bank Board and FSLIC contended that the order was properly
based on section 1730(e)(1). 7 4 The Bank Board took the position that
63. 665 F.2d at 285.
64. Reich v. Webb, 336 F.2d 153 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 915 (1965).
65. National State Bank v. Long, 630 F.2d 981, 988 (3d Cir. 1980) (Bank Board's authority
over federal savings and loan institutions is pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976)).
66. The Comptroller of the Currency regulates federal banks with cease and desist power
under 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1) (1976).
67. Id.
68. Id § 1730(e).
69. 665 F.2d at 285 (citing People v. Coast Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 98 F. Supp. 311 (S.D.
Cal. 1951)).
70. 665 F.2d at 286.
71. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (amending scattered sections of 12 U.S.C., including 12 U.S.C. § 1832).
72. Judge Holloway wrote the majority opinion with respect to the validity of the remedial
order of the Bank Board, with which Judge McKay concurred, and Judge Logan dissented.
73. 665 F.2d at 286.
74. 12 U.S.C. § 1730(e)(1) (Supp. IV 1980) provides:
Such order may, by provisions which may be mandatory or otherwise, require the
institution or directors, officers, employees, agents, and other persons participating in
the conduct of the affairs of such institution to cease and desist from the same, and
further to take afjimative action to correct the condtions resulting from any such violation or
practice.

Id. (emphasis added).
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Otero's illegal "jumping of the gun" by offering "Check-In" accounts before
they were legally permissible created an unfair advantage over its law-abiding competitors.7 5 It was this advantage that the Bank Board's order attempted to remedy.
The Bank Board argued that its remedial powers are equivalent to those
of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), which has power to redress
unfair labor practices by ordering affirmative action to effectuate the policies
of the National Labor Relations Act. 76 The Bank Board argued that if the
penalty was struck down, Otero "will have succeeded in violating the law
with impunity. ' 77 The order, in pertinent part, stated:
Due to the length of time inherent in any cease and desist proceeding, Otero's interpretation would mean that a party could violate
the existing statute, well in advance of the effective date of amendments, knowing that the cease and desist process could not be
brought to bear before the arrival of the effective date. Whatever
legislative purpose may have been served in delaying the effective
date would, to a large extent, be thwarted.78
Otero, however, argued that the FSLIC and Bank Board may only prevent unlawful conduct, take affirmative action to correct conditions resulting
from such conduct, and ensure that in the future the institution is law-abiding. 79 Otero contended that the moratorium was beyond the Bank Board's
power to prevent illegal conduct because it would prevent Otero from engaging in lawful conduct.80
Judge Holloway's majority opinion, relying on legislative history, 8 1
agreed that the Bank Board's powers are limited. Judge Holloway argued
that the Bank Board is permitted to ensure only that institutions operate in a
legal, safe, and sound manner. The Board does not have "a mandate to use
whatever means seem desirable" to ensure a competitive balance among
82
financial institutions.
Judge Holloway attempted to bolster this holding with several decisions
that actually appear to weaken the court's limitation of the Bank Board's
power. In First National Bank of Eden v. Department ofthe Treasuy ,83 the Comptroller of the Currency determined that a federal bank had engaged in unsafe and unsound practices by paying excessive salaries and bonuses to its
executive officers. Based on language identical to section 1730(e), the Comptroller required the bank to limit future personnel expenses and required
75. 665 F.2d at 287.
76. National Labor Relations Act § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976). The NLRB has authority to require a wide variety of remedies. See, e.g., Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. NLRB, 319
U.S. 533 (1943) (company union ordered to dissolve); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S.
177 (1941) (company required to offer employment to certain persons).
77. 665 F.2d at 288.
78. Decision and Order at 21, reprined at 665 F.2d at 289.
79. 665 F.2d at 287.
80. Id. Now, "Check-In," and similar types of accounts became legal after Dec. 31, 1980.
12 U.S.C. § 1832(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
81. S. REP. No. 1482, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., repritedzn 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEWS
3532, 3538.
82. 665 F.2d at 288.
83. 568 F.2d 610 (8th Cir. 1978).
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reimbursement of excess bonuses.8 4 Judge Holloway's opinion explained that
the FirstNational Bank ofEden's penalty "was properly directed to preventing
future specified abuses and reversing the direct, identifiable efects of the past practices on the bank's financial soundness." 8 5 It is arguable, however, that the
Bank Board's order in Otero was properly directed at preventing future
abuses and "reversing the direct, identifiable effects of the past practices" of
illegally offered "Check-In" accounts.
The Tenth Circuit majority also relied on Groos National Bank v. Comptroller of the Currency,86 in which the Comptroller issued an order prohibiting a
bank from making future advances to a controlling shareholder. The bank
in Groos argued that there was no evidence that such dealings with the shareholder constituted unsafe and unsound banking practices. The Groos court
upheld the order and stated that when the Comptroller finds a violation, it is
within his allowable discretion to fashion relief in order to prevent future
abuses of "problematic practices that have occurred in the past." 87 The
Tenth Circuit explained that the Comptroller was limited to addressing future identified unlawful practices.88 Although the Tenth Circuit court drew
no distinction between "problematic" and "unlawful" practices, under Groos
the Comptroller can address broader, problematic practices, and is not limited solely to unlawful abuses.
Judge Holloway's opinion concluded that the Bank Board's cease and
desist orders were limited "even if Otero's past actions go unpunished."8 9
The Tenth Circuit noted that section 1832(c) 9 0 permits the Bank Board to
assess fines for past violations of section 1832; however, in the instant action
no fine was imposed on Otero. 9 1
Judge McKay concurred in the limitation of the Bank Board's remedial
power and stated that he doubted that Congress had intended to grant the
Bank Board authority to impose remedies except against practices which are
unsafe or unsound. Judge McKay argued that gaining a competitive advantage in the market is not an unsafe or unsound practice for Otero's financial
92
future.
Judge Logan issued a strong dissent arguing that under section
1730(e)(1), the Bank Board has power to "take affirmative action to correct the
conditions resultingfrom any such violation or practice.' '9 Although Judge Logan
conceded that the Bank Board's grant of power is narrower than that of the
NLRB, he argued the Bank Board's power is sufficiently broad to support
imposing the moratorium on new accounts. 94 Judge Logan's opinion used
the legislative history and cases cited by the majority to lend support to his
84. Id. at 611.
85. 665 F.2d at 288 (emphasis added).
86. 573 F.2d 889 (5th Cir. 1978).

87. Id. at 897 (emphasis added).
88. Otero, 665 F.2d at 288.

89. Id. at 289.
90. 12 U.S.C. § 1832(c) (Supp. IV 1980).
91. 665 F.2d at 289 n.9.
92. Id. at 291-92 (McKay, J., concurring).
93. 12 U.S.C. § 1730(e)(1) (Supp. IV 1980) (emphasis added).
94. 665 F.2d at 292 (Logan, J., dissenting).
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conclusion that the Bank Board had power to remedy the conditions resulting from Otero offering illegal "Check-In" accounts. Judge Logan argued
that neither Bank of Eden nor Groos limit the Bank Board's power to ensure
95
future legal conduct by the financial institutions.
In addition, Judge Logan explained that the Bank Board could have
ordered Otero to close all new accounts it had wrongfully gained, but the
Board had rejected this remedy because of the inherent delays in implementing the order, the inconvenience to Otero's customers, and the danger to
Otero's safety and soundness that could result from widespread withdrawals. 96 The Bank Board determined that section 1832(a) was designed by
Congress to limit competitive inequality, and the effective date was intended
to allow all affected associations "to reach the starting gate" at the same
time. 9 7 Theoretically, if the Bank Board's remedy worked, Otero would be
deprived of new accounts equal to those it wrongfully gained.
Judge Logan argued that the moratorium on new accounts could not be
considered punitive, as the majority contended, based on the United States
Supreme Court test in Local 60, United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. NLRB. 98
The Supreme Court considered NLRB orders to be punitive when the orders
neither removed the consequences of the violation nor dissipated the effects
of the prohibited action. 99 Judge Logan argued that this test was clearly
applicable to the Bank Board since it is authorized to take affirmative action
to correct conditions resulting from illegal, unsafe, or unsound practices.
Under this Supreme Court test, the moratorium is not punitive, Judge Logan asserted, because "it will correct at least partially the effect of the
violations." 10o
The well-reasoned dissent in Otero argues that deference should be
shown to the Bank Board's order,' 0 l which, while attempting to remedy
Otero's head start, also sought to protect Otero's safety and soundness, as
well as the innocent account holders.' 0 2 Judge Logan's opinion is strong
support for the contention that the Bank Board's remedial powers extend to
assessing the moratorium.
The majority opinion, which limits Bank Board authority, was weakly
argued and supported, and could create adverse consequences. The limitation of the Bank Board's remedial power could be interpreted as allowing an
institution to violate an existing statute, well in advance of the effective date
of amendments, with impunity, due to the delays inherent in a cease and
desist proceeding. Such an interpretation could thwart the legislative purpose for the amendments, and leave the Bank Board without remedy to correct the conditions resulting from such a violation.
95. Id.

96. Id.
97. Id.
98. 365 U.S. 651 (1961).
99. Id. at 655.
100. Otero, 665 F.2d at 293 (Logan, J., dissenting).
101. See, e.g., NLRB v. Gissell Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 612 n.32 (1969); Moog Indus., Inc.
v. FTC, 355 U.S. 411, 413 (1958).

102. 665 F.2d at 293.
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III.

BANKRUPTCY

The recent case of In re Shannon 103 presented the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals with the interesting question of what time limitation applies to a
notice of appeal during the transition period of the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978 (the Reform Act).1 °4 The Reform Act made extensive changes in
10 5
the procedures by which appeals are taken from the bankruptcy court.
The provisions of the Reform Act become effective on different dates
throughout a transition period ending April 1, 1984, at which time the Reform Act becomes fully effective. 10 6 Section 248 of the Reform Act stipulates a thirty-day deadline for notice of bankruptcy appeals to the circuit
courts, however, it is not effective until April 1, 1984,107 and the Reform Act
does not provide any express time for filing bankruptcy appeals to the circuit
courts until that date.
In Shannon, the plaintiff-appellant, Marian Berg, sought review of a January 12, 1981 order of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Colorado dismissing her objection to the bankruptcy discharge of Jimmie
Shannon.1 08 Eighteen days later, Berg filed a notice of appeal to the district
court, along with a motion to extend the time for filing the notice. 0 9 The
bankruptcy court advised the parties that, by stipulation, an appeal could be
taken directly to the court of appeals. On March 10, 1981, a notice of appeal
was filed in the Tenth Circuit-nearly two months after the bankruptcy or0
der had been entered."I
The Tenth Circuit was concerned with the timeliness of the appeal, and
therefore, its jurisdiction to consider the appeal. Under the new Bankruptcy
Reform Act, both district courts and courts of appeal share original jurisdiction over appeals from the bankruptcy courts."' The amendments to sec103. 670 F.2d 904 (10th Cir. 1982).
104. Pub. L. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified at 11 U.S.C. and scattered sections of 15,
18, and 28 U.S.C.)
105. Id.
106. See Title IV of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, §§ 401-405, 92 Stat. 2682-85 (1978).
This statement may not be accurate following the recent United States Supreme Court
decision in Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 102 S. Ct. 2858 (1982),
which invalidated the broad grant ofjurisdiction granted to bankruptcy courts under 28 U.S.C.
§ 147 1(b) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Since § 1471 of the Act has been held unconstitutional, the
Act may not become fully effective without further legislative amendment.
107. See § 405 and § 402 of the Reform Act, 92 Stat. 2682, 2685 (1978).
108. 670 F.2d at 905.
109. The extension of time was granted retroactively to Jan. 30, 1981. 670 F.2d at 905.
110. Id.
111. 28 U.S.C. § 1293 (1976) was amended under the new Act to provide:
(a) The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of
panels designated under section 160(a) of this title.
(b) Notwithstanding section 1482 of this title, a court of appeals shall havejurisdictionof
an appealjfom a final judgment, order, or decree of an appellate panel created under
section 160 or a District Court of the United States or from a final judgment, order, or
decree ofa hankruptcy court of the United States if the parties to such appeal agree to a direct appeal
to the court of appeals.
§ 236(a) of the Reform Act, 92 Stat. 2667 (1978) (emphasis added).
In addition, 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (Supp. IV 1980) states that district courts "shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final judgments, orders and decrees of bankruptcy courts." § 238(a)
of the Reform Act, 92 Stat. 2667-68 (1978).
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tions 1293 and 1334 of title 28 of the United States Code'' 2 make clear that
the appeal filed in Shannon is within the circuit court's general appellate jurisdiction "so long as it was timely filed."' 13
In general, under section 2107 of title 28 of the United States Code 1 4 a
notice of appeal to the circuit courts must be filed within thirty days after
the entry of judgment. However, this section states that it specifically "shall
15
not apply to bankruptcy matters or other proceedings under Title 11."'
The new Reform Act amended section 2107 to make the thirty-day deadline
applicable to bankruptcy appeals after April 1, 1984.116 This congressional
oversight created the dilemma in Shannon.
Relying on the Eighth Circuit opinion of Andrews v. South Dakota Student
Loan Assistance Corp., 1 7 the Tenth Circuit held that the thirty-day time period is currently applicable to bankruptcy appeals, and that the failure to
refer specifically to section 2107 in the transition period was inadvertent." 18
The court held that the transition provisions of the Reform Act were intended by Congress to make the same jurisdiction and procedures currently
applicable as if the new Reform Act were fully effective.' 9 Therefore, the
Tenth Circuit construed the legislative intent to make the thirty-day time
limit effective as of the date the circuit courts acquired jurisdiction over di120
rect appeals from bankruptcy decisions.
The Shannon appeal, filed nearly two months after the bankruptcy judgment, was dismissed as untimely. The Tenth Circuit further held that because the appeal was jurisdictionally defective when filed, appellate
112. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1293, 1334 (1976), amended by § 405(c)(1), (2) of the Reform Act, 92 Stat.
2685 (1978), provides, in pertinent part:
(c)(1)
During the transition period, an appeal from a judgment, order, or decree
of a United States bankruptcy judge shall be(B) if the parties to the appeal agree to a direct appeal to the court of appeals
for such circuit, then to such court of appeals;
(2)
During the transition period, the jurisdiction of the district courts, the courts
of appeals, and panels of bankruptcy judges to hear appeals shall be the same as the
jurisdiction of such courts and panels granted under the amendments made by sections 236, 237, 238, and 241 of this Act to hear appeals from judgments, orders, and
decrees of the bankruptcy courts established under section 201 of this Act.
113. 670 F.2d at 906.
114. 28 U.S.C. § 2107 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
115. Id.
116. Section 248 of the new Reform Act, 92 Stat. 2672 (1978) amended 28 U.S.C. § 2107
(1976) by striking out the sentence that makes the deadline inapplicable to bankruptcy matters.
117. 636 F.2d 233, 235-36 (8th Cir. 1980).
118. The Shannon court held: "We can envision no legislative purpose in making an avenue
of appeal available during transition and intentionally omitting the time frame for appeal. We
believe the failure to specifically refer to 28 U.S.C. § 2107 in the transition sections of the Act
was inadvertent." 670 F.2d at 906. See In re Adamo, 619 F.2d 216, 219 (2d Cir.),cerl. denied, 449
U.S. 843 (1980) (inadvertence in supplying effective date of other sections of the new Reform
Act).
119. The court based its interpretation of legislative intent on H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 460, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 6416. See In re
Kutner, 656 F.2d 1107 (5th Cir. 1981).
120. 670 F.2d at 907. See 28 U.S.C. § 1293 (1976),amendedby § 236(a) of the Reform Act, 92
Stat. 2667 (1978).
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jurisdiction never transferred from the district court.' 2 '
In re Calh'ster' 22 presented the Tenth Circuit court with a second issue
involving appellate jurisdiction under the Reform Act over a bankruptcy
court order. Calhster was an appeal from an order of the United States
123
which granted creditor IngerBankruptcy Court for the District of Utah,
soll-Rand Financial Corporation (IRFC) a "superpriority" and ordered the
payment of interim attorney fees awarded to counsel for the debtor and the
24
IRFC, which was granted a "superpriunsecured creditors' committee.'
125
appealed
ority" of $29,868, pursuant to section 507(b) of the Reform Act,
the order to the Tenth Circuit alleging that the bankruptcy court erred in
awarding interim attorney fees that would be paid in advance of its
superpriority.
The Cal/ster court agreed with the parties that jurisdiction is conferred
26
on the Tenth Circuit under the new Bankruptcy Reform Act. 1 The Tenth
Circuit court noted that there is some confusion regarding the applicability
27
howof certain sections of the Reform Act during the transition period;'
28
that the intent of the
ever, the court relied on its holding in In re Shannon,'
Reform Act's transition provisions "make currently effective the same jurisdiction and procedures that will apply to the bankruptcy court system when
29
Thus, section 1293(b) of title
the [Reform] Act becomes fully effective."'
28 will apply and confer jurisdiction to a court of appeals from afinal judg130
The issue then is whether
ment, order, or decree of a bankruptcy court.
an order conferring interim attorney fees is a final order.
Interim awards of compensation, such as the attorney fees in Calhser,
3
are authorized pursuant to section 331 of the Reform Act.' ' Section 331
allows for repeated application to the court for reimbursement and compensation, and such awards are subject to amendment or modification during
132
The Tenth Circuit held that
the pendency of the bankruptcy proceeding.
121. 670 F.2d' at 907. Because the appeal was defective when filed, mandatory dismissal
under Interim Bankruptcy Rule 8007 did not become operative and appellate jurisdiction remained in the district court.
122. 673 F.2d 305 (10th Cir. 1982).
123. In re Callister, 15 Bankr. 521 (D. Utah 1981).
124. 673 F.2d at 306.
125. 11 U.S.C. § 507(b) (Supp. IV 1980).
126. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978), codified in
28 U.S.C. § 1293(b) (Supp. IV 1980).
127. The transition period runs from Oct. 1, 1979, to Apr. 1, 1984, when the new Act becomes fully effective. 673 F.2d at 306.
128. 670 F.2d 904 (10th Cir. 1982).
129. Id. at 906.
130. 28 U.S.C. § 1293(b) (Supp. IV 1980) (emphasis added).
131. 11 U.S.C. § 331 (Supp. IV 1980) provides that:
A trustee, an examiner, a debtor's attorney, or any professional person ... may
apply to the court not more than once every 120 days after an order for relief in a case
under this title, or more often if the court permits, for such compensation for services
rendered before the date of such an application of reimbursement of expenses incurred
before such date . . . . After notice and a hearing, the court may allow and disburse
to such applicant such compensation or reimbursement.
132. Cal/isier, 673 F.2d at 306.
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such awards are within the court's discretion,13 and may be re-examined, 13 4
adjusted and ordered refunded 13 5 by the court during the course of the case.
Since interim awards are not final adjudications on the question of compensation, the appellate panel held that they are interlocutory in nature.' 36
Thus, the court concluded it was without jurisdiction under the Reform Act
to review interim awards.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decided a number of divergent
issues under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (the "Act")1 3 7 in In re Beery.' 3 8 The
principal issues presented by the bankrupt, Jerome G. Beery, were:
1) whether the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to convert his Chapter XI
reorganization proceeding into a Chapter 7 bankruptcy after the Chapter XI
petition was withdrawn, 2) whether bankrupt Beery was a farmer, and
3) whether the bankrupt's fifth amendment rights were infringed by the order of the district court requiring him to testify at a bankruptcy hearing.
The Tenth Circuit court found against the bankrupt on all issues.
First, jurisdiction of a Chapter XI proceeding was held not to be lost by
39
the bankruptcy court upon the voluntary withdrawal of the petition.'
Bankruptcy Rule 11-42(a) prescribes that when a debtor files a motion to
dismiss the court should "enter an order after hearing on notice dismissing
the case or adjudicating him a bankrupt whichever may be in the best interest of the estate."' 140 Although Beery's voluntary withdrawal of his petition
was not a motion to dismiss, the court considered it as such. 14 1 Thus, the
bankruptcy court did not lose jurisdiction, and could either dismiss the case
or adjudicate Beery a bankrupt. The bankruptcy court chose to adjudicate
Beery a bankrupt, but entered its order under rule 11-42(b)(1),' 4 2 instead of
rule 11-42(a) (2), with the finding of lack of prosecution. The Tenth Circuit,
however, found this to be of no consequence because the "necessary finding
that adjudication was in the best interest of the estate was made in any
event."' 4 3 In addition, the appellate court found that the basis of lack of
prosecution under rule 11-42(b)(1) was clearly satisfied by Beery's refusal to
133. Ste In re Solar Mfg. Corp., 190 F.2d 273 (3d Cir.), cert. deniedsub nom. McGird v. Mintz,
342 U.S. 893 (1951).
134. See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
331.03 (L. King 15th ed. 1981).
135. See In re Arlan's Dept. Stores, Inc., 462 F. Supp. 1255 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), affd, 615 F.2d
925 (2d Cir. 1979) (interim award refunded to estate due to misconduct).
136. 673 F.2d at 307.
137. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, codified at II U.S.C. §§ 1-1200 (1976), repealedby Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549.
138. 680 F.2d 705 (10th Cir.) cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 449 (1982).
139. 680 F.2d at 709.
140. Bankruptcy Rule 11-42(a)(2). This rule applies if the petition was filed, as here, under
Rule 11-6. 680 F.2d at 709.
141. Id.
142. Bankruptcy Rule 11-42(b) provides:
The court shall enter an order, after hearing on such notice as it may direct
dismissing the case, or adjudicating the debtor a bankrupt if he has not been previously so adjudged, or directing that the bankruptcy case proceed, whichever may be in
the best interest of the estate(1) for want of prosecution . ...
143. 680 F.2d at 709. The bankruptcy court based its findings on Beery's admission of his
inability to pay his debts and that his liabilities exceeded his assets by more than one million
dollars. Id. at 709-10.
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sign and verify his petitions and schedules. ' 4 4 Thus, the bankruptcy judge
had jurisdiction to adjudicate Beery a bankrupt and to direct the case to
45
continue as a straight bankruptcy.'
The bankrupt's second contention was that he should have been considered a farmer, and therefore, could not have been adjudicated a bankrupt
under section 779 of the repealed Bankruptcy Act 146 and Rule 11-42(e).
The Bankruptcy Act defines a farmer as one who is personally engaged in
farming or tillage of the soil, and who derives the principal portion of his
income from farming.147 Beery's appeal argued that the method used by the
bankruptcy court in determining that the principal source of his income was
not from farming was erroneous. ' 48 The bankruptcy court found that based
on gross income Beery's principal income was from grain and commodities
dealings rather than farming. 149 Beery argued, without evidentiary support,
that although his grain company had a large cash flow, the profit margin
was small.' 50 The circuit court, however, held that gross revenues or receipts
is the proper standard in determining principal source of income. 15 1 The
court reasoned that in many instances a bankrupt may not have much income from any source. 152 The definition of farmer was clarified in section
101(17) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.153
Another issue on appeal was whether Beery's fifth amendment rights
were violated because of the bankruptcy court order that compelled the
bankrupt to testify without a grant of immunity.' 54 The Tenth Circuit
found section 25(a)(10) of the repealed Bankruptcy Act to be controlling on
the issue. Section 25(a)(10) states that the bankrupt shall, at the creditors'
meeting and under court order, submit to an examination concerning his
business and his bankruptcy. The statute provides that no testimony given
by him can be offered into evidence against him in any criminal
55
proceeding. '
The statute thus provides immunity against the use of testimony and
evidence derived from such testimony, if the testimony was the result of a
compulsory court order. Based on testimony derived from the 1977 hearing,
the Tenth Circuit found that Beery was clearly ordered to submit to exami144. "For want of prosecution" under Rule 11-42(b)(1) includes the failure to file schedules
and statements and the withdrawal and abandonment of a plan. See Advisory Committee
Notes to Rule 11-42.
145. 680 F.2d at 710.
146. 11 U.S.C. § 779 (1976).
147. Id. § 1(17).
148. 680 F.2d at 713.
149. Id. Beery owned an enterprise known as Brownville Grain Co. that purchased grain
from farmers, sold it for cash and then paid the farmers. Id. at 715.
150, Id. at 717.
151, Id. at 714.
152. Id See 1 H. REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY § 131 (5th ed. 1950).
153. I1 U.S.C. § 101(17) (Supp. IV 1980), defines farmer as a person who, "received more
than 80 percent of such person's gross income during the taxable year of such person immediately preceding the taxable year of such person during which the case under this title concerning such person was commenced from a farming operation owned or operated by such person."
154, 680 F.2d at 718.
25
155. II U.S.C. §
(a)(10) (1976).
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nation, and thus, came within the protection of the statute.' 5 6 Therefore,
the Tenth Circuit refused to accept Beery's claim that his fifth amendment
157
rights were infringed upon by the order requiring his testimony.
Beery's constitutional privilege was protected by section 25(a)(10) for
compelled testimony'- 8 even though Beery was not expressly granted immunity at the time his answers were compelled. The immunity was independently granted under the statute. The Tenth Circuit court held that no
infringement of the bankrupt's fifth amendment rights had been
59
demonstrated.'
Although not involved in the Beefy decision, the Tenth Circuit noted
that section 25(a)(10) was repealed under the Reform Act. 160 Under the
Bankruptcy Reform Act, in order for a witness to be ordered to testify before
a bankruptcy court over the assertion of a fifth amendment privilege, the
United States Attorney must request an immunity order from the district
court. The witness could be required to testify if immunity were granted. If
16
not, the witness could claim his privilege against self-incrimination. '
IV.

A.

CASE DIGESTS

Assignment of Unearned Insurance Premiums Under the Truth In Lending Act

In 1980, the Tenth Circuit in James v. FordMotor Credit Co.,' 6 2 and its
companion case, Hernandez v. O'Aleal Motors, Inc., 16 3 held that the assignments
of unearned automobile damage insurance premiums are not security interests under the Truth In Lending Act (the Act),' 64 and do not have to be
disclosed by the sellers in the installment contract.' 65 The plaintiffpurchasers filed a joint petition for certiorari. 166 While the petition was
pending, the United States Supreme Court decided Anderson Brothers Ford v.
Valencza 167 in accordance with the Tenth Circuit's holdings in James and
Hernandez that an assignment of unearned insurance premiums does not create a security interest under the Act.
The Supreme Court subsequently vacated the Tenth Circuit's Her156. The appellate court noted that immunity under 11 U.S.C. § 25(a)(10) has not been
granted to bankrupts in all bankruptcy proceedings. 680 F.2d at 719. See, e.g., White v. United
States, 30 F.2d 590, 592-93 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 872 (1929) (bankrupt had testified
voluntarily).
157. 680 F.2d at 720. See 11 U.S.C. § 25(a)(10) (1976); IA COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
7.21[l] (J. Moore 14th ed. 1978).
158. The Beery court relied on Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). The constitutional problem is discussed further in United States v. Beery, 678 F.2d 856 (10th Cir. 1982).
159. 680 F.2d at 720.
160. Id. at 720 n.18. The statute, II U.S.C. § 25(a)(10) (1976), was repealed by 11 U.S.C.
§ 344 (Supp. IV 1980).
161. 11 U.S.C. § 344 (Supp. IV 1980), which applies 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005 (1976 & Supp.
IV 1980) to bankruptcy proceedings.
162. 638 F.2d 147 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 453 U.S. 901 (1981).
163. 638 F.2d 153 (10th Cir. 1980), vacated, 453 U.S. 901 (1981).
164. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1976) as implemented under Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226 (1982).
165. For a discussion of these cases see Overview, Commercial Law, Eighth Annual Tenth Circuit
Survey, 59 DEN. L.J. 227 (1982).:
166. James v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 453 U.S. 901 (1981) (cert. granted).
167. 452 U.S. 205 (1981).
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nandez 168 decision insofar as it directed dismissal against the petitioners and
remanded on the question of alternative bases for liability against the automobile sellers on the automobile installment contracts that were not considered by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. 169 On remand, the Tenth
Circuit in Brown v. FrontierFord,Inc.,' 70 found the Supreme Court's directive
to consider the issue of alternative bases for liability "puzzling" because that
issue had never been presented to the court of appeals and was raised for the
7
first time in the plaintiff-purchasers' petition for rehearing.' '
The Tenth Circuit deferred to the Supreme Court's holdings that "the
requirement of finality is to be practically rather than technically construed."' 172 The court remanded the cases back to the district court for further consideration of all issues, including alternative bases of liability, except
those based on the question of whether assignments of unearned automobile
173
insurance premiums were security interests.
In the unpublished decision of Quandelacy V.Wayne Lovelady's FrontierFord,

Inc., 174 the Tenth Circuit held it has become "firmly established" that an

assignment of returned or unearned premiums for physical damage automobile insurance is not a security interest. Under the Truth in Lending Act,
such an assignment is not required to be disclosed on the face of the automobile installment sales contract. 175 The court remanded the case to the district court with directions to dismiss. Thus, the controversy concerning
disclosure under the Truth In Lending Act for assignments of unearned insurance premiums in an automobile installment contract appears to be settled in the Tenth Circuit.
B.

Postmaturity Interest Charge Not Within Usury Statute

In Smith Machtneiry, Co., Inc. v. Jenkins 176 a promissory note that provided
for a postmaturity interest rate above the statutory usury limit was held not
to be within the purview of the usury statute. Jenkins, the defendant-purchaser, appealed to the Tenth Circuit court claiming that under New Mexico statutes 1 77 the postmaturity rate was usurious, requiring a forfeiture of
168.

Nine cases involving purchaser-plaintiffs suing sellers or lenders under the Truth-in-

Lending Act were consolidated with Hernandez v. O'Neal Motors, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 491 (D.
N.M. 1979) including petitioners Jackson and Delores Brown, the named plaintiffs in Brown v.
Frontier Ford, Inc., 666 F.2d 1291 (10th Cir. 1981) which was remanded to the Tenth Circuit
during the period covered by this survey.
169. James v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 453 U.S. 901 (1981).
170. 666 F.2d 1291 (10th Cir. 1981) (the Hernandez case was not involved in the Supreme
Court remand).
171. Id. at 1293.
172. Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152-53 (1964); Cohen v. Beneficial
Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545 (1949).
173. 666 F.2d at 1293.
174. No. 80-1452 (10th Cir. Nov. 16, 1981).
175. See Anderson Bros. Ford v. Valencia, 452 U.S. 205 (1981).
176. 654 F.2d 693 (10th Cir. 1981).

177. The New Mexico usury statute at issue is as follows:
Rates ofInterest Allowed-Minimum Charge.-The interest rate shall be the rate agreed to

by the parties, except that [it] shall not exceed ten percent (10%) per annum computed
upon unpaid balances for the actual elapsed time during which such balances ... are
unpaid where the evidence of indebtedness is secured by collateral security ....
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The promissory note at issue required repayment in two annual installments. The note bore an interest rate of ten percent until maturity and a
rate of twelve percent after maturity.' 7 9 The maximum interest rate allowed
by law at that time was ten percent. 180 Jenkins failed to make the first payment on the note and Smith Machinery brought an action seeking a judg81
The
ment on the note and court authorization to repossess the collateral.
lower court directed a verdict in favor of Smith Machinery.
The issue on appeal was whether postmaturity interest rates are covered
by the usury laws of New Mexico. The Tenth Circuit court followed established case law in its holding that if the usury statute is silent, limitations on
82
Such
interest rates charged do not apply to postmaturity charges.'
postmaturity charges are deemed penalties for nonpayment rather than
8 3
However,
charges for the use of money and are not subject to usury laws.'
the appellate court noted that such charges may be considered usurious
when the usury law limits interest rates that can be applied on the "deten184
The New Mexico statutes at issue detion" as well as the use of money.
85
indicating that a
note consensual agreements between the parties,'
not consented to by the
withholding or detention by the borrower that is 86
lender is outside the purview of the usury statute.'
The Tenth Circuit held that the mere fact the parties agreed to a
postmaturity interest rate will not make the arrangement a "forbearance" of
87
The promissory note did not allow
payment subject to the usury statute.'
Jenkins to defer payment until after maturity. Therefore, the Tenth Circuit
court held that the situation was a "detention" of money rather than a "forbearance," and was not covered by the usury statute. 188
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-6-16 (1953).
178. The penalty statute for usury provides that:
The taking, receiving, reserving or charging a rate of interest greater than that allowed
by this act, when knowingly done, shall be deemed a forfeiture of the entire amount of
such interest which the note, bill, or other evidence of debt carries with it or which has
been agreed to be paid thereon ...
Id. § 50-6-18 (1953).
179. 654 F.2d at 694.
180. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-6-16 (1953).
181. 654 F.2d at 695.
182. Id. at 696.
183. See, e.g., In re Tastyeast, Inc., 126 F.2d 879 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 696 (1942);
Scientific Prods. v. Cyto Medical Lab., Inc., 457 F. Supp. 1373 (D. Conn. 1978).
184. 654 F.2d at 696 (citing Ulviden v. Sorhen, 58 S.D. 444, 237 N.W. 565 (1931)).
185. N. M. STAT. ANN. § 56-8-9A (1978) specifies the scope of the usury statutes.
[N]o person, corporation or association, directly or indirectly, shall take, reserve, receive, or charge any interest, discount, or other advantage for the loan of money or
credit or the forbearance or postponement of the right to receive money or credit except at the
rates permitted in Sections 56-8-1 through 56-8-21 NMSA 1978.
Id. (emphasis added).
186. 654 F.2d at 696.
187. Id.
188. Id. See Ferguson v. Electric Power Bd., 378 F. Supp. 787 (E.D. Tenn. 1974), aft'd, 511
F.2d 1403 (6th Cir. 1975).
The defendant-purchaser also argued that he had paid the debt by delivering a bill of
lading for the machinery to a Smith Machinery salesman the evening before trial and, without
the company's consent, had placed it with common carrier to be shipped to the company. The
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C. Sale of Repossessed Homes Excluded From Uniform Consumer Credit Code
In Circle o.Jim Walter Homes, Inc.,' 8 9 the Tenth Circuit court held that
the sale of repossessed shell homes, financed at annual rates of ten percent or
less, are not consumer credit sales subject to the Oklahoma Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC).' 90 The appeal involved consolidated class actions brought in federal court under its diversity jurisdiction against Jim
Walter Corp. and its subsidiaries.' 9 ' The members of the class were purchasers of defendant's shell homes who contended that the defendant was
liable for violations of the Oklahoma UCCC because negotiable instruments
were taken as evidence of the purchasers' indebtedness in the sales

transactions. 192
Jim Walter Corp. built shell homes on real properties owned by the
purchaser-plaintiffs. The facts indicated that when credit sales were made,
negotiable notes were used to evidence the purchasers' indebtedness and
mortgages were taken on the real estate to secure the debt. In the event of
default, the repossessed homes and accompanying land were sold to new
buyers, often also on credit arrangements. The Oklahoma version of the
UCCC states that in a consumer credit sale, the seller may not take a negotiable instrument other than a check, as evidence of the obligation of the
buyer.19 3 A consumer credit sale includes the sale of "goods, services, or an
94
interest in land."'
The district court in Oklahoma held that the sales are not consumer
sales under the Oklahoma UCCC, and are excluded as sales of an interest in
land financed at ten percent or less.' 9 5 The appellant-purchasers argued
that this exclusion was inapplicable because the property was sold by a contract for deed whereby, under Oklahoma law, no equitable or legal interest
passed until the buyers had fully performed. 196 In addition, the buyers argued that the original sales consisted only of the shell homes, which are
"goods" under the UCCC, and would retain that characteristic even though
the homes were repossessed and resold along with the underlying land.' 9 7
Tenth Circuit court held this insufficient proof that Smith Machinery had accepted it in payment of the debt. 654 F.2d at 697.
189. 654 F.2d 688 (10th Cir. 1981).
190. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, § 2-101 (West 1972).
191. 654 F.2d at 689. The resjudicata effect of a foreclosure suit followed by a judicial sale
was raised on appeal but will not be discussed herein.
192. Although three classes of purchasers were discussed by the trial court, only members of
Class I will be discussed herein. The members of Class I were purchasers of the repossessed
homes. 654 F.2d at 689-90. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, § 2-104(2)(b) (West 1972).
193. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, § 2-403 (West 1972) provides that: "In a consumer credit
sale or consumer lease, other than a sale or lease primarily for an agricultural purpose, the seller
or lessor may not take a negotiable instrument other than a check as evidence of the obligation of the buyer or
lessee." Id. (emphasis added).
194. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, § 2-104 (West 1972).
195. The statute, in pertinent part, excludes from the UCCC:
[Al sale ofan interestin land ifthe credit service charge does not exceed ten percent (10%) peryear
calculated according to the Actuarial Method on the unpaid balances of the amount
financed on the assumption that the debt will be paid according to the agreed terms
and will not be paid before the end of the agreed term.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, § 2-104(2)(b) (West 1972) (emphasis added).
196. 654 F.2d at 690.
197. Id.
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The Tenth Circuit panel affirmed the lower court in holding that the
sales by contract for deed were excluded from the UCCC. The appellate
court, relying on Tenth Circuit precedent,' 98 held that "regardless of when
legal title to land passes, the land is deemed to have been 'purchased' upon
the execution of a binding contract for deed."' 9 9 Oklahoma statutes are in
accord with this finding. 2° ° In addition, the official comment to section 104
of the UCCC 20 explains that the ten percent interest rate exclusion was
intended to exclude home mortgages from UCCC coverage, while retaining
UCCC coverage of the higher interest rate, smaller type of real estate
20 2
loans.
The appellant-purchasers' argument that the shell homes were "goods"
under the UCCC despite being resold with the underlying property was easily dismissed by the Tenth Circuit court based on the general property law
20 3
rule that a building erected upon a tract of land becomes part of the land.
Thus, the sale of repossessed homes in transactions involving annual finance
charges of ten percent or less are excluded from the UCCC under Oklahoma
law.
Rebecca L. Wilcox

198. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 462 F.2d 908, 910 (10th Cir. 1972)
(court rejected the Internal Revenue Service's argument that no "purchase" occurred until deed
was delivered after full performance in contract for deed sale).

199. 654 F.2d at 690.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, § 2-105(b) (West 1972) (sale of an interest in land includes
lease with option to purchase).
201. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. § 2-104(2)(b) (West 1972).
202. 654 F.2d at 690.
203. Id. at 691. See Shelton v. Jones, 66 Okla. 83, 167 P. 458, 460 (1917); Mid-State Homes,
Inc. v. Martin, 465 P.2d 791 (Okla. Ct. App. 1969).
200.

